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On September 7, 2012, Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho broadcast a
message from his official residence announcing a change in the shares that workers and
employers contributed to the Taxa Social Unica (TSU), or social security tax: workers
would pay 7 percent more, while employers would pay 5.75 percent less. This was part
of the strategy of austerity implemented since 2009 to recover from the Eurozone crisis,
a combination of public spending cuts, tax increases, and pro-market reforms. While the
Portuguese people went into the streets to protest, the main business associations had an
unexpected similar reaction: immediate public rejection. Antonio Saravia, the head of
the Industrial Confederation of Portugal (CIP), accused the government of not listening
to social partners and added that “never should the decrease in the TSU be compensated
by workers.”1 The government withdrew the measure two weeks later and subsequently
changed its economic team. Afterward, the General Secretary of the Portuguese
Commerce and Services Confederation (CCP) would recall the moment and say that
“No one asked them to go that far.”2
By contrast, when on July 11, 2012 the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy
went to Parliament to announce the largest economic adjustment of the democratic
era—65,000 million EUR achieved through a combination of cuts to public servants,
the unemployed, and dependent people, as well as an increase in taxes—the business
sector applauded it. When the two labor organizations, the Workers’ Commissions and
the General Union of Workers, called for a general strike on July 14, business
associations criticized them. Juan Rosell, the head of the Spanish Confederation of
Business Organizations (CEOE), said that the economy required “deep, painful and
courageous” reforms and asked for further reductions in expenditures and less increase
in taxes.3
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The different responses from capital in Portugal and Spain were all the more
surprising—and consequential—regarding the policy of labor market liberalization.
These measures, designed to decrease the cost of labor, should have been widely
endorsed by capital, yet in practice that varied across cases. In 2012, when the
Portuguese government set restrictive conditions on the extension of agreements to the
sector-level to allow wages to adjust (downwards) to firm productivity, Portuguese
businesses were overwhelmingly against it. Two years later the government reversed
this measure. By contrast, the 2012 labor reform in Spain that gave priority to firm-level
collective agreements over sector-level ones was celebrated by the industrial export
sector and remains in place.
This difference in the extent of labor marketization in Portugal and Spain is all the
more puzzling given that this was the key strategy mandated by international creditors
for these countries to overcome the crisis. The politics of economic adjustment in the
region as determined by the international institutions, which were in turn heavily
influenced by Germany, was based on the manufacturing model of cost competitiveness
that prescribes the reduction in labor costs to increase exports. In the Eurozone, without
the possibility of modifying the exchange rate—the standard tool for indebted countries
to stimulate exports and decrease imports—internal devaluation becomes the only
possibility to achieve that goal. Indebted countries, like Portugal or Spain, thus
committed to a combination of austerity and structural reforms to reduce domestic
demand and increase productivity. Labor reforms were the centerpiece of this response,4
yet Portugal did not follow the prescribed path. What explains this variation?
There are two dominant comparative approaches to this period of economic
adjustment. The most prominent approach has understood austerity to be the only viable
response to economic hardship, heightened by the pressure from the European
Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). While in normal times policy-makers have a hard time implementing
austerity measures, during periods of financial crises the combination of fiscal
constraints, bond market pressures, and demands from international institutions that
supply financial assistance provide opportunities for adjustment and liberalization,
while leaving little space for deviation.5 However, reforms were not only signals for
financial markets, but also attempts at reshaping these countries’ economies. As such,
they have material and differential effects on societal actors that will in turn
react—something that these approaches overlook. A second group of studies focused on
domestic politics to understand policy responses, analyzing the impact of partisanship,6
technocratic beliefs,7 labor organizations,8 and, more broadly, forms of democratic
practice.9 However, none of these variables alone can account for systematic variation
in policy change across these two countries.
An analysis centered on business preferences accounts for important variation left
unexplained by these other approaches. Governments are able to advance the
liberalization of labor markets when there is a leading industrial export sector that
benefits from it and provides a powerful domestic social partner for technocrats and the
European institutions recommending those policies. Against the common assumption
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that the liberalization of labor markets is not only sought, but widely embraced by capital, I
show that, beyond a general preference for lower labor costs, business interests are
heterogeneous and influence policy in unexpected ways. I advance the theory that business
positions on liberalization are shaped by sector and firm-size production strategies, as well as
binding associational commitments. Corresponding to these variables, business will have
different preferences for the different dimensions of labor liberalization, including
employment protection legislation (EPL) and collective bargaining (CB). In addition,
policy-makers mostly take into account the interests of those business sectors that are relevant
to the model of economic growth they prefer and dismiss the rest.
To assess these frameworks, I turn for insight to the debtor countries in Southern
Europe, a region harshly hit by the 2008 financial crisis, which constitutes a “most
likely case” for a uniform shift to austerity and labor market reforms. I build this
argument through a close examination of the post-financial crisis reforms implemented
by Spain and Portugal, two similar countries subjected to a common crisis as well as
structural pressures for austerity. I accomplish this through an in-depth qualitative
analysis of interview data collected during twelve months of fieldwork in Lisbon and
Madrid, where I conducted 129 interviews with politicians, policy-makers, bureaucrats,
members of business associations and labor confederations, representatives from
international institutions, and country experts.10 In addition, I analyzed original
documents (public statements and policy reports) concerning the relevant policy
changes from government, business, and labor. I have also examined the documents
produced by the EC, the ECB, and the IMF, including financial assistance agreements
and regular reports on the countries’ economies, as well as the specific policy
evaluations and studies assessing the labor market reforms.
Labor Markets in Southern Europe
Labor markets in Southern Europe have generally been considered to be defective. The
Varieties of Capitalism literature groups Southern European countries under a
“Mediterranean” model,11 characterized by delayed and state-supported industrializa-
tion, with extensive labor market regulations.12 Levels of employment protection above
the OECD average, together with intermediate levels of centralization in their CB
systems (neither peak, nor firm-level), contributed to the characterization of these labor
markets as overly rigid.13 Their high levels of employment protection meant relatively
strict restrictions on individual and collective dismissals—including definitions,
notification procedures, length of the notice period, and severance payments—that
supposedly created disincentives to hire and highly dualized labor markets. Their CB
systems involved regional and sectoral employers’ associations signing agreements with
the corresponding unions. Because of low affiliation rates,14 extension mechanisms
made sure that agreements became binding for the whole economic sector, creating a
baseline rule. Thus, while there was no coordination at the national level—since there
was no one peak-level agreement—there was some coordination at the sector level. Firms
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that wanted to sign their own agreements had to offer better conditions than those of the
sector-level, thus only the most productive firms could afford it. These agreements were
also perpetuated in time thanks to “ultra-activity” clauses, which stated that—absent a
new agreement—existing agreements would apply even beyond their expiration date.
These intermediate levels of centralization in the CB systems were considered
particularly problematic. Throughout the 1990s, and despite joining the Eurozone,
Southern Europe continued to lag in productivity levels, and in the 2000s the region’s
international position was hurt because of inflation.15 Both phenomena were assumed to
be tied to an inefficient bargaining system.16 Arguably, either decentralized or
centralized systems achieve the best results in terms of adjusting wages to firm
productivity,17 while intermediate ones impede it and disincentivize the management
and reorganization of the production at the firm-level (internal flexibility).18 Sector-level
agreements can also become artificial barriers to entry to other firms and hinder
competition, with negative effects on creation of formal employment and wages.19
Although the actual value of labor costs and the role they played in the economic
imbalances in Southern Europe is still a matter for debate,20 when the Great Recession
hit the region, wages were the first target of policy-change. If too many labor protections
and an inefficient bargaining system had led to increasing labor costs that had in turn
hurt the international position of these countries, it was the labor market that had to be
reformed. The measures that the international institutions demanded included the
decrease in employment protection, making dismissals easier and cheaper, and the
adjustment of the bargaining system to the firm-level, away from regional/sectoral
bargaining between sectoral associations and unions. In the context of the post financial
crisis, Southern European countries adopted these policies.
However, while reforms targeting EPL followed closely the international requirements
and were fairly similar across countries, the changes in CB were not. Regarding
employment protection, both countries took similar measures and moved closer to the
OECD average. Yet, despite common pressures to decentralize CB and give more power to
the employer at the firm-level, Portugal and Spain took different paths. While the former
initially advanced a radical decentralization of bargaining and ended the (until then almost
automatic) extension of collective agreements to the sector, it reversed its course two years
later. In this way, it returned to the same intermediate sectoral system, also keeping
substantial restrictions on the suspension of collective agreements and a longer survival date
after expiration. Spain, on the other hand, altered the formal structure of bargaining, as it
made firm-level agreements take precedence over sector and regional level ones, gave
unprecedented power to employers to opt-out of agreements—even those at the firm-
level—and reduced its survival date after expiration.21
Assessing Explanations of Austerity and Reform
International Constraints How well do existing theories of the politics of economic
reform account for the different outcomes in Portugal and Spain? The Eurozone crisis is
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precisely the kind of shock that research focusing on external pressures would regard as
leading to common policy change across countries. Under these expectations,
convergence toward adjustment should occur because it is the subordination of
domestic politics to international and structural pressures that guides it.
An initial line of studies in political economy used the neoclassical understanding
of liberalization policies as a public good22 to delineate the dynamics of policy
change.23 Following work done mostly by economists, it understood reform to have a
majority of the society as a diffuse beneficiary and powerful vested interests as
immediate losers, predicting that the first group would not organize in favor of change,
while the second would strongly oppose it. Reform could then only result from external
pressures—either in the form of international institutions, insulated decision-makers, or
both—with technocrats as agents of a transnational elite consensus, who had to
neutralize the losers of economic change.24 This focus on international constraints
expected countries to follow a similar pattern of policy change, but research on Latin
America after the debt crisis of the 1980s showed that restrictive external circumstances
did not amount to complete policy convergence,25 and there was much unexplained
variation.
Still, the Eurozone crisis could be understood as a peak of international and
structural pressures that could only lead to a relatively standard package of policy
change.26 While deep fiscal restrictions and sovereign debt crises forced domestic
governments to adjust their economies, the European institutions further narrowed the
available alternatives of policy responses by attaching conditions to membership, in
general, and to financial relief in particular. Taking membership in the Eurozone as
given, its countries cannot modify the exchange rate and can only implement internal
adjustments. Moreover, countries that received a financial rescue from the group formed
by the EC, the ECB, and the IMF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that
established a package of policy change—including labor market liberalization—with
strict external monitoring of performance and compliance. Countries that did not receive
a bailout but are nevertheless facing rising bond yields and the increasing costs of
servicing debt, may in turn still implement those policies to reassure the European
institutions and the financial markets.27
In the cases of Portugal and Spain, both countries have belonged to the Union since
1986 and neither could devalue its currency. Similarly, the depth of fiscal crises and the
amount of financial assistance received constrained the policy choices of these
governments. Both countries were among the hardest hit of the Eurozone economies in
the 2008 financial crisis, and both entered conditional financial assistance programs with
the European institutions and the IMF. By 2010, the Portuguese economy accumulated
two decades of sluggish growth, public debt figures over 90 percent of GDP, and banks
without market access to cover their financing needs. After failing to get parliamentary
approval for its fourth stability program, the government requested financial assistance
from the international institutions. On May 17, 2011 it signed two separate versions of a
MoU (one with the EC and one with the IMF) that, in exchange for 78 billion EUR,
committed the country to fiscal consolidation (a reduction of the public deficit from 5.9
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percent of GDP in 2011 to 3 percent in 2013 that was to be achieved by a drastic
reduction in expenditure and a rise in taxes), financial sector reform, and “bold and
upfront structural reforms to improve competitiveness.”28 Among the latter, the
liberalization of the labor market was the most important policy goal. The MoU devoted
five of its thirty-six pages to detailing changes in labor policy, the same number of pages
that was devoted to all goods and services markets, and more than the three and a half
pages assigned to the financial sector.
With an economy in recession since mid-2008, a heavily indebted private sector,
banks and government unable to access market financing at sustainable rates, and
contagion fears from the sovereign debt crises in neighbor countries, the Spanish
authorities signed a MoU on Financial-Sector Policy-Conditionality on July 20, 2012. In
exchange for up to 100 billion EUR, the government committed to reforming its banking
sector, as well as “implement the country-specific recommendations in the context of the
European Semester,”29 including as a third item “the labor market reforms.”30 These
institutional demands were accompanied by enormous pressure from financial markets.
However, even under this substantial pressure for liberalization, there is no
consistent pattern whereby Eurozone membership was translated into a uniform set of
labor market reforms in the region.
Domestic Politics If the focus on external pressures leaves much to be explained, how
well do domestic variables—institutions and actors that inevitably filter those pressur-
es—account for variation in reforms? Economic liberalization in Latin America had strong,
concentrated supporters.31 This led to further theoretical elaboration and the possibility of
reform involving the opposite political logic—concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. Thus,
it was not only about neutralizing the losers, but also empowering the winners, and a series
of works explores how coalitions organize in support of liberalization. Scholars analyzed the
role of electoral competition,32 partisanship,33 bureaucracies and ideas,34 business,35 and
labor organizations36 to understand policy choices.
A series of studies focused on party politics showed that party ideology mattered
for labor market reform.37 Other scholars have questioned this relation between left-
wing parties and pro-labor policies, looking instead at specific constituencies among
workers.38 Still, the cross-country comparison allows me to control for the party-
ideology effect and focus on differences in policy change under two conservative
governments. In both countries, the adjustment process was launched by the social-
democratic parties (contradicting their pro-labor ideological traditions), with conserva-
tive governments continuing and deepening the process.39 This development also
conflicts with Sara Watson’s historical work on the construction and maintenance of
welfare systems in Portugal and Spain, which she ties to historical intra-left divisions.40
She argues that the presence of a strong radical-left party may lead social-democratic
and conservative parties to coalesce and implement liberalization policies to isolate it,
and its absence may bring conservative parties to extend protection for workers to
compete for centrist voters and weaken the social-democrats. However, in a juncture as
pivotal as the Eurozone crisis, conservative parties in the two countries converged in
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their macroeconomic strategy: the imposition of austerity and the liberalization of labor
markets.
Research has also highlighted the role of technocratic beliefs in policy change.
Experts’ ideas—in particular those of economists—can re-shape political discourse to
legitimize certain policies and even be adopted by the government and turned into public
policies.41 These approaches have led to studies that explain the imposition of austerity in
the debtor countries through the power of the beliefs held by economists and bankers in
the European and supra-national institutions, and in the countries in crisis.42 In fact, the
transnational consensus around austerity and labor market reform largely coincided with
the beliefs of domestic party technocrats, both left and right. Far from blaming the
external institutions, the authors of the labor reforms in both countries claimed their
agency.43 Still, while there is no doubt that there was a powerful technocratic consensus
around austerity, there is no systematic correlate of the extent to which it was able to
change the broader economic orientation of the country. At the end of the day, this
consensus did not dictate policies—technocrats converged, while policies diverged.
Beyond these arguments, other research has contended that is the differential openness of
the political systems that has made Portugal more susceptible to societal pressures from
below.44 An example of this research is Robert Fishman who argues that it is the different
forms of transition to democracy that helped forge diverging approaches to social and
economic demands in Spain and Portugal.45 In Portugal, a transition to democracy through
social revolution created a political system where elites are more open to listening to societal
demands and negotiating policies with relevant actors and groups from civil society. Portugal is
thus characterized by a “broadly shared commitment of the major political actors to address
social concerns through state actions.”46 This has been used as an explanation for Portugal’s
historically superior employment outcomes and larger welfare expenditures, as well as its more
equity-friendly adjustment path during recent times of austerity.47
I complement these ideas and argue that this openness is also simultaneously a
vulnerability of the political system, which stems from a division in the elites. The
stability of elite alignments and the presence of elite allies are relevant dimensions of
political opportunity structures for collective action.48 Specifically, elite cleavages are a
major impetus for mobilization given that lack of elite cohesion makes the political
system more susceptible to change. Thus, I claim that the main difference across
countries lays in the preferences of business and how they aligned or diverged with the
government. Thus, while in Spain the leading industrial export sector supported the
reform that the conservative government advanced, in Portugal business was against it.
In Portugal, therefore, the pressure from below was joined from above by a segment of
the elite that was divided in their preferences.
Economic Structure and Preferences for Austerity and Reforms
Rather than assigning primary importance to international and structural constraints or
to the preferences of relatively autonomous technocratic policy-makers, I understand
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change to advance through policy-makers’ ability to form coalitions of supporting social
groups.49 However, I shift the focus from organized labor—traditionally the main
societal constraint on liberalization of labor markets—to business. Although this actor is
generally taken to support and advance liberalization, it does not favor all dimensions
equally, or uniformly. I show that even when it comes to labor reform, business can
become the main obstacle for change.
The different components of the labor reform are Employment Protection
Legislation (EPL) and Collective Bargaining (CB). Policy changes in both areas are
destined to decrease labor costs—a demand shared by international institutions, policy-
makers, and employers—yet they do so in different ways. While the first is directly
destined to decrease labor costs (by making dismissals easier and cheaper, firms can lay
off “old” workers and hire newer and cheaper ones),50 the second one has the same
goal, but goes through the organization of the system of CB, which affects competition
issues, industrial conflict, firms’ transaction costs, and the activity of business
associations. While business homogeneously supported the decrease in EPL, it mostly
opposed the decentralization of CB.
As mentioned, CB agreements that are extended to a whole sector of the economy
set the baseline rules for all the corresponding firms. Many prefer this for a myriad of
reasons that go beyond labor costs. First, it sets a level playing field and prevents unfair
competition through lower wages or other practices.51 Second, it prevents industrial
conflict and the presence of worker representatives at the firm-level, given that the
agreement happens at a higher level, conducted by specialized association officials and
the corresponding union.52 Third, it is cheaper for firms that do not have to negotiate
their own agreements and can instead follow someone else’s rules.53 Finally, CB above
firm-level is the reason for the existence (and, often, public funding) of the employers’
associations that negotiate and sign those agreements.54 If bargaining were to happen at
the firm-level, associations would cease to exist,55 or would have to transform into a
lobby-type organization.
However, some firms, mostly concentrated in the industrial export sector, prefer to
sign their own agreements. This is because they have the opposite characteristics: they
are cost-competitive, rely on more skilled labor, and pay relatively high wages; they
prevent industrial conflict by negotiating periodically with the corresponding firm-level
union representatives; and are organized in associations that do not conduct CB, but
instead function as a lobby group. These firms are constantly seeking to make
production more flexible and to decrease costs through their own agreements. While
they were already able to do that in the existing regime, a legal change towards
decentralization allows them to, first, turn a practice into a law, and, second, affect the
way the rest of the economic sectors are organized.
Therefore, my expectations regarding business preferences for labor market reforms
are that 1) all firms in these economies will prefer low levels of employment protection
legislation; 2) most firms in these economies will favor the continuation of the
centralization of labor relations; and 3) only a small set of firms, concentrated in the
industrial export sector, will favor the decentralization of labor relations.
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Needless to say, not all preferences matter the same. To understand the connection
between business interests and policy-making, it is important to take into account their
power. However, I do not evaluate it only in terms of size of the sector, GDP
contribution, or associational density, but also, and foremost, in terms of affinity with
the preference of reformers. I argue that reformers take the initiative for policy change
with a certain model of economic growth and a corresponding type of business sector in
mind, export-oriented and cost-competitive. Thus, they will mostly take into account the
interests of those sectors and dismiss others, either by delegitimizing them (accusing
businesses that opposes these measures of being rent-seekers) or denying them outright
(ascribing to businesses different preferences than the ones they express). Still, while
those neglected sectors may not be able to stop the reforms they dislike, they will
attempt to undermine them.
Trends from Southern Europe
I draw on evidence from Southern Europe, where governments turned to austerity and
reforms after the 2008 financial crisis. In particular, labor market reforms constituted a
key feature of policy-makers’ strategy for economic recovery. Regardless of the
competitive position of these economies (worse in Portugal than in Spain) and the actual
levels of labor costs (lower in Portugal than in Spain), both governments followed the
international institutions’ recipe to implement a wage devaluation.
While the outcomes regarding EPL were fairly similar across the two countries, the
changes in CB were not.56 In terms of EPL, Spain and Portugal had stricter regulations
than the European average and reforms in both countries were directed towards
flexibilization. Moreover, in Portugal, the government went beyond what the agreement
with the external institutions mandated, particularly when it came to facilitating and
lowering the costs of dismissals. The changes were effective, as measured by the OECD
indicator of Employment Protection that put post-reforms Portugal only slightly above
the average, and Spain exactly on average.
Meanwhile, in terms of the system of CB, and despite common pressures to
decentralize it, Portugal’s current system is the same as the pre-crisis one—agreements
are extended to the whole economic sector and become binding for all firms—while
Spain’s has changed to give priority to firm-level agreements over higher-level ones.
In the case of Portugal, the MoU stated the need for decentralization, suggesting the
revision of the criteria for extension of agreements. Until then, agreements signed by
employers’ associations representing a few firms and the corresponding trade unions
were extended to the whole sector by the Employment Ministry, thus covering the entire
industry. The government first eliminated the extension principle and later made it
subject to the representativeness of the business organization, at least 50 percent of
workers of the sector.57 However, it was precisely because of low affiliation rates
among employers and workers that this extension mechanism had been imposed in the
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first place. With those restrictions, there would be no extensions: the government had
ended the industrial relations framework as it existed until then.
Nevertheless, two years later the government reversed course. In 2014, after leaving
the rescue program, the same conservative government added an alternative condition
for extension. It established that if 30 percent of the firms in the association signing the
agreement were Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs, or firms with less than 250
workers), the agreement should be extended.58 Since 90 percent of Portuguese firms
were SMEs, this made extension almost automatic, thus essentially returning to the pre-
crisis system. The external institutions deemed this measure “a major setback in the
reform of collective bargaining in Portugal,”59 and the former Secretary of State for
Employment wrote an op-ed expressing his opposition to the reversal, claiming it was
anti-competitive and conducive to a reduction in employment levels.60 In addition, the
government also sustained restrictions for suspensions of collective agreements and a
longer survival date after expiration.
Spain, instead, altered the formal structure of CB, giving precedence to the firm-
level agreements over those at higher levels, as well as granting the power to employers
to opt-out from collective agreements and reducing the survival date of agreements after
expiration. With the reform, firm-level agreements began to have priority over sector-
level agreements, and firms were able to unilaterally decrease wages to the minimum
wage.61 Thus, firms were able to leave not only the sector-level agreement, but also the
firm-level one. In addition, the reform set a twelve-month limit on the extension of
expired agreements, leaving workers covered by the proximate higher-level agreement
that sets lower standards and, ultimately, by the Workers’ Statute that sets the very
minimum standards. This degree of decentralization of bargaining was the most radical
in the region, together with that of Greece.62
This difference in outcomes is explained by differences in business support.
Although we would expect measures destined to decrease the cost of labor to be widely
endorsed by capital, in practice that varied across cases. All business supported the
decrease in EPL, but only the large exporters in Spain favored the decentralization of
CB. The majority of business, small firms with low productivity heavily oriented to the
domestic market, rejected it.
The cases of Portugal and Spain usefully demonstrate the factors and sequence
described above. A “similar systems” logic motivates the decision to focus on these two
particular cases.63 These countries share, among other relevant covariates, a sub-type of
capitalism, levels of economic development, and similar types of industrial relations and
social protection systems. Likewise, they were subject to a common crisis and enormous
pressure towards adjustment. They are then two “most likely” cases for labor market
reform, but they show variation in outcomes that demonstrates the interplay between
policy-makers’ ideas and business interests, based on one key structural difference
between the two cases: the presence of a strong group of industrial exporters in Spain.
10
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Portugal Austerity and labor market reforms in Portugal between 2011 and 2015 reflect
the competing pressures of technocratic policymakers and the interests of capital—a
divided elite. While external institutions and markets pushed for reform, and the
conservative government that took power in June 2011 following the initiation of
adjustment by the socialists implemented an austerity agenda that went even beyond those
pressures, business expressed opposition to the key change in labor policy. The
government initially reformed the structure of industrial relations, advancing the
decentralization of CB against the opposition of most business sectors. Two years later,
however, the government backtracked.
In May 2011 the socialist government signed an MoU committing to a combination
of austerity and structural reforms in exchange for financial support. Shortly thereafter,
the Socialist Party lost the elections and the conservative government that followed
implemented that reform agenda. The devotion of the new government to the austerity
agenda was notable, and, arguably, it used the external institutions’ pressure to carry out
its own, more aggressive, plan of policy change.64 The government put a particular
emphasis on reforms in the labor market area. Indeed, the Secretary of State for
Employment said that this was the area with the most changes and assured that “it was
not about ticking boxes . . . we studied, we looked at data.”65
The 2011–2015 Executive that resulted from a coalition between the Social-
Democratic Party (SDP) and the People’s Party (PP) was more technocratic than any
previous government of the right-wing SDP. Pedro Passos Coelho, the Prime Minister,
made his commitment to adjustment explicit by saying publicly that they would go
“beyond the Troika.” The people he chose to lead the Finance, Economy, and Labor
ministries were all technocrats and outsiders, both to the country (they resided abroad)
and to political parties (many of them were professors or officials in external institutions
and/or banks). These economists, together with neoliberal think tanks like Compromisso
Portugal and Forum para a Competitividade, had been debating for years the need to
re-orient the economy towards export-led growth through economic adjustment, in the
form of internal devaluation and labor reforms.66
Still, when it came to labor, the government was unable to sustain the key change:
the decentralization in CB. While in the dimension of EPL the government went beyond
what had been agreed with the external institutions, in the dimension of CB the
government initially advanced a radical decentralization, but later backtracked. This
decision was guided by the opposition of most business sectors, which not only
complained publicly, but also refused to embrace the new system. The Secretary of
State for Employment acknowledged this when saying that “all social partners were
against the establishment of a representativeness criteria,” and that they “threaten[ed] to
not sign agreements, if they were not going to be extended.”67 He added that this,
together with the fact that the rescue program was over and the economy growing,
explained the reversal.
Most business sectors were not convinced of the general strategy of internal
devaluation in order to turn towards export-led growth. The economic structure of
Portugal—characterized by an overwhelming majority of small firms, with low levels of
11
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productivity and oriented to the domestic market—was a clear determinant. In 2011,
only 5 percent of firms had more than ten employees,68 the country’s productivity levels
were half of those in Germany,69 and exports of goods and services accounted for 34
percent of GDP.70 That is why the General Secretary of the CCP complained that “the
government wanted to give a shock to capital via wage devaluation, but the structure
does not change from one day to the next. Only very few Portuguese firms export, and
we cannot compete through low wages.”71
In particular, when it came to the labor reform, business did not embrace it
uniformly. While business was generally interested in lowering labor costs, they
supported the decrease in EPL, but did not agree with the decentralization of CB.
Regarding employment protection, they had been asking for more flexible conditions
for hiring and dismissing workers. In particular, the decrease in severance payments
became the main request during the crisis, as it would allow them to lay-off workers and
restructure firms. They were thus satisfied that severance payments for individual
dismissals decreased and it became easier to use temporary contracts.72 Moreover, they
continued to claim a longer trial period for permanent contracts and defended the
existence of temporary contracts.73
However, when it came to the decentralization of CB, another measure destined to
decrease labor costs, business rejected it for a myriad of reasons that exceeded the effect
on wages. The first issue had to do with competition. Naturally, business feared that
those firms that were part of associations and signed agreements would face different
conditions from those that were not in associations and would not be bound by those
agreements.74 Thus, business preferred to maintain a level playing field.75 Second, with
respect to industrial conflict, celebrating firm-level agreements would also mean having
the union at the firm, something most wanted to avoid.76 The third reason had to do with
transaction costs. Small firms were unable to carry their own CB and expected support
from the sector.77 Finally, the confederations not only represented firms that were
mostly against the change,78 but also had their own existence tied to their affiliated
associations engaging in CB. Without extension mechanisms, “confederations would
lose their role.”79 Thus, the four business associations opposed the measure and sent a
letter to the IMF complaining about it.80
The absence of allies in the business community meant that the Portuguese
government could not sustain the labor changes. The divisions within the elite became
evident. While business was not able to stop the reform, it had the capacity to
undermine it: under the conditions for extensions, employers’ associations refused to
sign agreements. Indeed, the CCP said that the restrictions would mean “the paralysis of
collective bargaining.”81 They explicitly accused the government of blocking the
system, since “firms alone are not going to increase wages, risking competing in unfair
conditions”82 Thus, what was supposed to work towards a decentralization of CB and
create a myriad of new (likely more flexible) agreements at the firm-level actually meant
no bargaining at all.
The case of textiles and footwear is the most telling. This is an industry that exports
more than 95 percent of its production and accounts for almost 4 percent of the
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country’s total exports, which indicates they should favor policies arguably conducive
to fostering export growth. However, the six associations in the sector refused to sign
any agreements under the restrictive extension mechanisms to avoid exposing their
associates to unfair competition from those not signing agreements and thus not covered
by them. In fact, they only returned to bargaining in 2015, after the change had been
reversed.83 The concerns of this sector were mostly tied to the qualifications and skills
of the labor force and not labor costs, so decentralization meant opening up to the
possibility of wage rivalries and dumping without addressing their main interests.
Why did the government not take into account these interests? Policymakers
delegitimized domestic firms’ preferences, accusing them of being too small, risk-
averse, not dynamic enough, and seeking state protection from markets, while saying
the government should instead focus on attracting foreign capital.84 The chief of staff of
the Minister of Finance noted that the tradable sector was not organized and did not
have a powerful single voice, adding that “it is not like what happens in Germany now
with the tariffs, where auto industries are asking for changes in the regulations.”85 In the
absence of the “correct” preferences from business, the government took the lead.
The Portugal case demonstrates that business did not uniformly support the
deregulation of labor markets. While it embraced the decrease in EPL, it was against the
decentralization of CB. A divided elite made the policy changes difficult to sustain. This
opposition from business translated into a boycott of the new system, and after two
years the government reversed the measure.
Spain Austerity and labor market reforms in Spain between 2011 and 2015 reflect the
concurring pressures of technocratic policymakers and the interests of a leading
business sector, a cohesive elite. The external and structural pressures were the same as
in Portugal and so were the preferences of those in government, but different interests
from business produced different outcomes in labor policy. While most businesses
opposed the decentralization of CB, the government went ahead with the support of the
most dynamic segment of the Spanish economy, the highly competitive industrial
export sector of car manufacturing.
On December 20, 2011, the conservative People’s Party took office, following
almost two years of economic adjustment imposed by the Socialist Party. The new
government showed its full commitment to the austerity agenda, and, specifically, to
changes in the labor market. The new Economy and Competitiveness Minister, Luis De
Guindos, put labor reform—together with changes in the financial sector—as the key
source of economic growth for the country, adding that “the central point of the labor
reform has to be the modification of the system of collective bargaining in Spain.”86 He
was also captured by TV cameras when he whispered to Olli Rehn, the European
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro, that the labor reform
would be “extremely aggressive” and “a true change.”
As in Portugal, the government arguably used the crisis and the external
institutions’ demands to implement its own plan of policy change.87 In particular, the
authors of the labor reform did not hide the fact that it was part of their agenda. The
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General Director for Employment and one of the writers of the reform explained that it
“had to be done,” and that they met with the EC only to inform them of what they would
do: “We wrote it, we showed it to the EC, and we kept our word.”88 Beyond the
government, the idea that economic adjustment and structural reforms were necessary to
turn the economy towards export-led growth was found in universities, in the research
services of the Central Bank of Spain as well as those of private banks, and in
policymakers’ circles.89
On February 12, the government approved a comprehensive labor reform that
constituted a structural alteration of the framework of industrial relations. Without
social consultation and ignoring a recent bilateral agreement between employers and
unions, the government advanced a radical decentralization of CB. This decision
responded to the preferences of a highly competitive industrial export sector—that of
automobile—but went against the interests of the majority of Spanish firms. This was
acknowledged by one of the writers of the reform: “Firms prefer external flexibility
and sector-level bargaining.”90
Indeed, while in general business favored the strategy of austerity, speaking
publicly in favor of the successive measures of economic adjustment,91 it was divided
around labor reform. Spain, like Portugal, is characterized by a majority of small and
medium firms (only 6 percent of firms had more than ten employees in 2011),92 of low
productivity and oriented to the domestic market, and an even lower share of exports
(29 percent of GDP in 2011).93 However, Spain has something that Portugal does not: a
select group of firms that are extremely competitive, which is known in the economics
literature as “the Spanish paradox.”94 Thus, the overall productivity levels of the
country were higher than those in Portugal, and more than 77 percent of those of
Germany.95
In this context, preferences for labor policies within business were divided and
often contradictory. Regarding employment protection, they supported the changes as
the head of CEOE said they were “in line with changes in Europe” and “introduced
flexibility in a very rigid labor market.” Moreover, business continued to ask for fewer
regulations for permanent contracts,96 but when it came to CB, most business sectors
believed the change had gone too far, with one key exception: the automobile sector.97
Most Spanish firms rejected decentralization for similar reasons to those in
Portugal. The first issue, again, was a level playing field. Sector-level agreements
worked as an element to control unfair competition.98 The second one involved
industrial conflict, as formal firm-level agreements would mean bringing the union to
the firm.99 The third one concerned transaction costs. Small firms simply did not have
the capacity for conducting their own bargaining and used sector-level agreements as a
reference.100 Even after the reform, around 10 percent of firms responded that they did
not have their own collective agreement because they lacked the knowledge to elaborate
and negotiate it.101 Indeed, a strong advocate of the reform, from the research service of
a private bank, admitted that small firms did not have a Human Resources Department
to take advantage of the changes.102 Finally, there was the CEOE, torn between the
interests of their larger and more productive companies, in favor of the decentralization,
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and those of the small and medium-size firms that were against.103 However, the
changes, in their content and their form, attacked something more fundamental: the
organization’s own existence. CEOE’s provincial and sectoral associations were in
charge of CB with over 10,000 people involved in the process.104 The leader of a
business group, who asked to remain anonymous, explained this system in blunt terms:
“They feed off collective bargaining.” The reform also attacked CEOE’s institutional
and symbolic role, as it was passed only a few days after business and unions had signed
a bilateral agreement disregarding its content.105 In this context, CEOE’s preferred
model was one that allowed for firm-level bargaining—authorizing firms that wanted to
negotiate at their level to do so—while keeping the sector-level as a frame—sustaining
the activity and institutional role of the regional and sectoral associations.106
However, there was a particularly powerful voice in the sector of large export-
oriented firms in support of the reform, that of the Spanish Associations of Automobile
and Truck Manufacturers (ANFAC). This association represents highly competitive,
foreign-owned car-makers that already bargain at the plant-level. Still, they had been
pressing for change in the law favoring lower-level agreements since at least 2010,
when the previous government was drafting its own reforms.107 Crucially, this
association is not an employers’ one; since there is no sector-level agreement, it is not
involved in bargaining, and it is simply an interest group. This sector is organized in
factories distributed across the country that compete with each other. In other words,
there is competition not only between different firms, but also between different
factories of the same firm. While the sector decreased its share in the economy in the
early 2000s because of inflation in the country, automobile firms in Spain were actively
seeking to compete with other European countries through lower production costs.
These costs are not only wages, but especially internal flexibility: "in the labor cost,
flexibility makes the difference.”108 The reform achieved four things for the sector. First
and foremost, it provided a legal status to what until then was a practice based on the
agreement of two parties (employers and unions). Second, it decreased the bargaining
power of unions, which could no longer threaten the firms with returning to the sector-
level agreement. Third, it gave these firms even more internal flexibility and leeway to
organize and differentiate working conditions and wages across factories. Finally, it
affected how the rest of the economy—and, crucially, the sector of automobile
suppliers—organized. Suppliers are a large part of the value chain and the most
important source of value added, and their market and production conditions are
controlled by car-makers.109 While CB arrangements among suppliers varied, in many
cases they were at the sector level. This reform allowed for decentralization, more
flexibility, and a decrease of costs along the whole chain.
Although, just like in Portugal, employers and unions that opposed the reform and
tried to prevent its enforcement, they were not successful. On the one hand, and despite
specific efforts from the government, the data show that there was no transition to firm-
level bargaining.110 On the other hand, the goal of the reform—to make the content of
collective bargaining agreements more favorable for employers—was achieved
regardless. The possibility of moving to a firm-level agreement was a threat that
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employers could use when re-negotiating the sector-level agreement to force workers to
accept employers’ preferred conditions.111
So why did the government advance the interests of one sector and not of the
majority? The decision was rooted in the fact that they considered a cost-competitive
industry like automobiles to be a key part of the export-led model of economic growth
they envisioned. “I want Spain to work as the automobile industry,” said the head of the
Economic Bureau of the President during the Socialist government.112 The Minister of
Economy of the conservative government also explicitly stated that the labor reform had
the goal of changing the growth model away from domestic demand and towards
exports.113 When he later announced a growth in automobile production, he credited
“the correct cost of labor” and the fact that “you have much more flexibility here in
Spain than in other areas.”114 Instead, the interests of most firms were dismissed—as
one of the authors of the labor reform said “a reform that no one likes, is a good
reform.”115
The Spanish case demonstrates that a key sector of business supported the
deregulation of labor markets. While all business embraced the decrease in EPL, only
the highly-competitive industrial export sector was in favor of the decentralization of
CB. With the support of this sector, and by forming a cohesive elite, the government
was able to advance their agenda.
Conclusion
To explain the difference in labor reforms in response to financial crises in Portugal and
Spain, this article examines the effects of labor policy for export-led economic growth
and the business interests of the two countries. Technocratic beliefs in favor of reform
and business preferences coincided in Spain—the elite was cohesive—while they did
not in Portugal—the elite was divided. Therefore, the Spanish government was able to
put forward and consolidate a change in the industrial relations framework, while the
Portuguese government initially advanced a more radical change, but later reversed it.
The literature’s overwhelming focus on external and top-down pressures for reform
obscures the material factors that can stand in the way of policy change. Countries
without a relevant export sector are harder to turn towards an export-oriented growth
model, no matter the economic hardship, the prescriptions from external institutions,
and the set of beliefs held by the domestic technocrats. Southern Europe, a region that
mostly relies on domestic consumption to generate growth, cannot swiftly reverse its
economic course. While reformers have the initiative for policy-change, capital interests
play a crucial role, either by promoting these changes or opposing them. Therefore,
legislative changes will not go far in changing industrial relations without a broad
coalition that includes at least some of the actors who will be affected by those changes.
In addition, my work shows that there is more than one road to compete
successfully in the economy. Portugal and Spain chose different paths, and their
trajectories since then do not overwhelmingly favor the latter, thus casting doubt on the
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effectiveness of the internationally-sanctioned agenda of austerity and pro-market
reforms. The way to a new model of economic growth and development is long and
intricate, and the trajectory is neither simple nor singular.
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Fernando Rocha Sánchez, and Esmeralda Sanz Berzal, El Impacto de la Reforma Laboral de 2012 en la
Negociación Colectiva (2013–2015) (Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras, 2016) for an explana-
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